Abstract-Software-defined networking (SDN) is a promising network paradigm for future Internet. The centralized controller and simplified switches replace the traditional complex forwarding devices, and make network management convenient. However, the switches in SDN currently have limited ternary content addressable memory to store specific routing rules from the controller. This bottleneck provokes cyber attacks to overload the switches. Despite existing some countermeasures for such attacks, they are proposed based on simplified attack patterns. In this paper, we review the table-overflow attack using a sophisticated attack pattern. In the attack pattern, attack flows are targeted at their middle hops instead of endpoints. We first define potential targets in the network topology, then we propose three specific traffic features and a monitoring mechanism to detect and locate the attackers. Further, we propose a mitigation mechanism to limit the attack rate using the token bucket model. With the control of token add rate and bucket capacity, it avoids the table overflow on the victim switch. Extensive simulations in different types of topologies and experiments in our testbed are provided to show the performance of our proposal.
Since the switches become highly primitive, the assigned routing rules from the controller are expected to be precise. Currently, OpenFlow [4] is the most widely used control link protocol owing to its fine-grained routing rules (i.e., flow entries) and abundant flow statistics. To support OpenFlow protocol better, the switches have to use ternary content addressable memory (TCAM) to store flow entries. However, considering the high cost and highpower consumption [5] , the current OpenFlow-enabled switches usually have limited flow table, which supports a few thousand flow entries [6] , [7] . For example, without the external TCAM, the NoviSwitch 2150 [8] can only store 16,384 flow entries.
As a result, how to use such limited cache efficiently and safely has been an active field of research. To help the switches store more flow entries without adding TCAMs, several proposals attempt to split the workload between the switches [9] , [10] or aggregate redundant flow entries [11] , [12] . Although these proposals are useful for normal users, they could be inefficient when attackers attempt to exhaust the switches. We call such attacks the table-overflow attack in this paper. Many recent studies [13] [14] [15] have paid attention to the table-over flow attack due to its significant negative impact, including higher energy consumption, flow table overflow and normal communication breakdown.
While the awareness of the table-overflow attack has been raised, existing studies [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] , [32] mainly consider the attack with simplified attack patterns. In the simplified attack patterns, only one or a few attackers attempt to overload a target switch using lots of unmatched attack flows. Moreover, the table-overflow attackers are assumed to be brute-force. It means that, the attackers choose their common ingress or egress (physically attached) switch as the target. Based on the simplified cases, a few security suggestions and countermeasures [18] , [32] are proposed in the literature.
However, in the real world operation, a sophisticated attack pattern is more attractive to the cyber attackers. In the sophisticated attack pattern, a group of attackers launch the table-overflow attack to a same target switch. And the target switch is a middle hop switch instead of their physically attached switches. Since when attackers launch the tableoverflow attack to their physically attached switch, they risk exposing themselves. Besides, the flow table consumption on the target switch (we call these consumption the attack payment) causes the same amount of flow table consumption on their physically attached switches (we call these consumption the attack cost). Therefore, the table-overflow attack is more likely to be launched by a group of attackers with the purpose of splitting the attack cost on their physically attached switches and hiding themselves.
In the sophisticated attack pattern, the attackers tend to choose a hot switch which has fewer vacancies in the flow table as the target switch. Their attack flows use the target switch as the middle hop instead of the endpoints, because when lots of abnormal flows share the same traffic feature, such as the destination IP, these flows trigger an alarm in the existing security mechanisms [18] , [19] . To identify a hot switch, an attacker may seek to use some common social engineering attacks to the network manager, or use route trace tools, or even invade the central controller to obtain the network topology to locate a hot switch.
Knowing the basic characteristics of the sophisticated tableoverflow attack, the objective of our work is to defend against it in SDN. Given an SDN topology, we first build a mathematical model to formulate the flow table consumption and the attack. Based on it, we define the potential targets. Then we propose three traffic features and a monitoring mechanism to detect the table-overflow attack and locate the attackers. Further, we propose a mitigation mechanism to limit the rate of attack flows using the token bucket model. It controls the token add rate and the bucket capacity with the consideration of the current flow table vacancy on the victim switch. Both the monitoring and mitigation mechanisms are embedded into the original routing process of SDN. Extensive simulations and experiments are conducted to evaluate our proposal. Here we summarize the main contributions of this paper.
• Most of the related studies investigate the table-overflow attack using simplified attack patterns. In this work, we consider a sophisticated attack pattern and propose a countermeasure to the sophisticated table-overflow attack.
• We build a practical mathematical model to formulate the flow table consumption and the attack. We provide a way to define the potential targets of the table-overflow attack.
• Three specific traffic features and a monitoring mechanism are proposed during the original routing process of SDN. It detects the attack and locates the attacker attached switches.
• A mitigation mechanism is proposed using the token bucket model. Given the current flow table vacancy on the victim switch, it limits the rate of attack flows and avoids the table overflow under different attack rates. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Some related work is introduced in Section II. The basic concept of SDN and the table-overflow attack is provided in Section III. In Section IV, we build the mathematical model to formulate the flow table consumption and the table-overflow attack. The monitoring mechanism and the mitigation mechanism are proposed in Sections V and VI, respectively. In Section VII, we show the simulation and experiment results of our proposal. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we introduce some related work about the table overflow problem of SDN.
A. Table Overflow Avoidance Under Normal Circumstances
For SDN-enabled switch vendors, such as NoviFlow [8] and Pica8 [20] , the only mature way to store more flow entries seems to be adding the number of TCAMs. In the literature, to find a better solution, the existing studies mainly go along two directions, i.e., heterogeneous flow entry and cache optimization.
The key concept of heterogeneous flow entry approaches is that not all arrived flows need an individual wildcard flow entry stored in TCAM. For example, DevoFlow [21] classifies flows into two types: the transient mice flow and the persistent elephant flow. It clones the mice flow's packet header to create an exact-match flow entry. Then the exact-match flow entry can be moved from TCAM to RAM. Similarly, Nguyen et al. [22] only assign specific rules to the elephant flows, the mice flows are handled by the default rules in switches. CacheFlow [23] only stores the most popular rules in a small TCAM. The rest of rules are cached in software switches using RAM. The rules stored in TCAM have a higher priority than the rules stored in RAM.
Besides, Banerjee and Kannan [24] propose Tag-In-Tag based on their former study about TCAM [5] . They utilize a combination of path tag and flow tag (24 bits in total) instead of the original flow entry (356 bits in total) to match a flow. The path tag exploits the path similarity between different flows. Likely, Huang et al. [25] divide flow entries into the universal rules and the local rules. They conduct different partition and allocation algorithms for different kinds of flow entries. In this way, these proposals reduce redundant rules in switches.
In contrast, the key concept of cache optimization approaches is that not all cached flow entries in TCAM need to follow a same and rigid update mechanism. For example, SmartTime [26] sets the idle timeout dynamically according to its observation of the repeated flow and the real time TCAM occupation. It aims to improve the utilization of TCAM (i.e., use a smaller idle timeout) while ensuring that TCAM miss does not increase (i.e., fewer flows are repeated). Similarly, MWFP [27] adjusts the idle timeout of flows with the consideration of the average interval between packets. It reduces the TCAM updates by setting a bigger idle timeout for the long-distance and unstable flow.
Besides, FDRC [28] aims at fine-grained cache management. It sets a timer for each flow entry to estimate the time of next hit. The rarely hit rules have a larger timer value and will be evicted once TCAM is full. Likely, MMS [29] cleans the rarely used or obsolete flow entries. It resides in the SDN controller and monitors the activity of applications. To free TCAM in the switches, MMS evicts the flow entries once their applications in the controller are terminated.
B. Table Overflow Avoidance Under DoS Attacks
The aforementioned proposals improve the accommodation of flow entries in SDN, however they are inefficient to handle malicious flows from cyber attackers. It has been proven that the limited flow table space can be easily exhausted by tableoverflow attackers [16] , [17] . To deal with such security issues, several mechanisms are proposed recently. AVANT-GUARD [30] is a security mechanism embedded in the SDN-enabled switches. It consists of a connection migration module and an actuating trigger module. The connection migration module is designed to monitor TCP session failures. The actuating trigger module is used to activate several predefined routing rules when lots of TCP session failures are observed. In this way, it protects the controller and switches from the SYN flooding attack.
Dong et al. [31] propose a detection method for the DDoS attack to the controller and switches. Such a DDoS attack utilizes a large number of low-traffic flows to exhaust SDN's routing system. The low-traffic flows have fewer packets than the normal flows, and they can lead to significant resources consumption in both the data plane and the control plane. In the proposal, the authors use SPRT (Sequential Probability Ration Test) to control the false negative and false positive rates.
The most related work to this paper is the QoS-aware mitigation strategy [32] . It prepares the idle flow table resources in the data plane for the table-overflow attack. By redirecting attack flows from saturated switches to idle switches, it makes SDN more resilience to such an attack. However, since the redirection action cannot limit the attack rate, its performance relies on the amount of idle flow table resources, and it may be unsatisfactory when there are no adequate idle switches or the attack rate is high. Moreover, the effectiveness of this approach relies on the identification of the attack. Since the authors did not provide a proper attack monitoring method, the effectiveness of their proposed solution is somewhat limited.
III. PRELIMINARY KNOWLEDGE
In this section, we introduce the original routing process of OpenFlow-based SDN and the table-overflow attack.
A. The Routing Process of OpenFlow-Based SDN
According to OpenFlow protocol, the SDN-enabled switch has to register its configuration and status before it can forward packets in the network. During this process, the controller builds a topology of the entire network. As shown in Fig. 1 , when an unmatched flow arrives at S src , S src sends a request to the controller. Then the controller traces the endpoint S dst and finds the middle hop S mid in the established topology. To make sure that the arrived flow is continuously transmitted, all switches in the routing path have to install a flow entry. During this routing process, the new arrived flow not only leads to flow entry installations on its ingress switch S src and egress switch S dst , but also on the middle hop (logically attached) switch S mid .
B. The Table-Overflow Attack in SDN
Currently, the switches in OpenFlow-based SDN usually have limited cache for flow entries. Table I shows the cache sizes of different OpenFlow-enabled switches. We can see that the OpenFlow-enabled switch generally can hold a few thousands of flow entries. Such bottleneck provokes cyber attackers to overload the switches. By generating lots of unmatched flows in a short time, the attackers trick the controller into assigning flow entries to a target switch intensively. Once the cache of the target switch is full of these flow entries, the target switch will be paralysed and the legitimated flows will be delayed or even dropped.
We note that the NoviSwitch 2128, 2122 and 1248 can support 1 million of flow entries using large TCAMs. Such amount of cache definitely can withstand most of the tableoverflow attack in the simplified model [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] , [32] . In the simplified attack model, the attack flows use the target switch as their ingress or egress in their routing paths, e.g., S src or S src in Fig. 1 . Such attack flows can be easily aggregated by the target switch according to their common ingress or egress. Unless the brute-force attacker targets a switch with fewer vacancies in the cache, the attacker has to generate attack flows at a very high rate.
However, in the sophisticated attack model, the attack flows use the target switch as their middle hop in their routing paths, e.g., S mid in Fig. 1 . Using different paths with a same middle hop, the attackers can accumulate useless flow entries on the middle hop. In the real world operation, the switch serves as a middle hop frequently in the network. This makes lots of available routing paths for the attackers. More importantly, such attack flows are difficult to be aggregated according to their common middle hop. To overflow a switch using large TCAMs, the sophisticated attack can utilize more routing paths and share the attack cost accordingly.
Besides, adding the number of TCAMs in the switch is an efficient way to improve the reliability of switch but not security. Especially for the sophisticated table-overflow attackers, adding cache may provoke more intense attacks. Therefore, the motivation of this paper is to keep the limited or finite cache from the sophisticated attackers.
IV. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
In this section, we build a mathematical model to formulate the above mentioned table-overflow attack. When switches finish their registration, the global view in the network controller can be viewed as an undirected and unweighted graph G = (S, L), where S represents the switch set and L is the physical link set. We use N to denote the number of switches. Then we formulate the flow table consumption in a discrete time model, where the time horizon consists of a series of time slots. We use l to denote the length of the time slot.
During a time slot t, the flow entries assigned to S i are viewed as a set R t i . Then we define the flow table consumption of S i in time slot t as
where card(R t i ) is the cardinality of set R t i . To give a further view of C i (t), we divide R t i into two parts: the local flow used set R 
Then we define the local flow consumption (i.e., C L i (t)) and the foreign flow consumption (i.e.,
Therefore, the flow table consumption
We use S i · S j to denote the routing path between S i and S j (flows from S i to S i are not considered in this paper). For the normal flows on the path, we formulate them as the generally used Poisson process [32] . Considering the fact that different paths have different amount of traffic. We use λ i·j to denote the unmatched flow arrival rate of path S i · S j and set it randomly for different paths. All symbols and variables used in this paper are summarized in Table II .
When the table-overflow attackers choose S i as the target switch, they generate flows on different paths which include S i as the middle hop. These attack flows lead to a huge foreign flow consumption C F i (t) during the attack. However, not all switches are attractive for attackers. As shown in Fig. 2 , the instinct of the attackers makes them choose a hot switch (e.g., S 2 ) instead of S 1 as the target, since S 2 is responsible for more normal flows and has fewer vacancies than S 1 . Therefore, before we monitor and further mitigate the table-overflow attack, we should identify the potential targets in a given graph G.
V. MONITORING THE TABLE-OVERFLOW ATTACK
In this section, we first define the potential targets according to their common feature. Then we design three traffic features to monitor the attack for the potential targets. Finally, we show how our monitoring mechanism is embedded into the routing process of SDN.
A. Definition of Potential Targets
To find potential targets in a given graph G, we can first exclude some switches that are secure from the table-overflow attack. Since the attackers generate attack flows on different paths which include the target as the middle hop. Switches that only act as the ingress or egress are not the candidate of potential target. For example, as the graph G shown in Fig. 3(a) , S 1 , S 4 and S 5 are not middle hops in any routing paths in G, and their foreign flow consumption C F i (t) ≡ 0 since their degree D i = 1. Therefore, we select potential targets from switches which satisfy D i > 1.
We use Algorithm 1 to build virtual graphs for switches with D i > 1. As shown in Fig. 3(b) and Fig. 3(c) , each virtual graph consists of a central switch S i and several virtual neighbors. The virtual neighbors are the paths in graph G, which include the central switch as the middle hop. When flows traverse in Fig. 3 . An example of building virtual graphs using G, in the virtual graphs, the paths in G represent virtual neighbors. graph G, the controller finds the shortest (in terms of hop, delay or some commercial cost) path between its ingress and egress switches. In this paper, the least number of hops is the shortest path. Then we use d i to denote the virtual degree of S i , and the virtual degrees of S 2 and S 3 are 3 and 5, respectively.
Algorithm 1: Building Virtual Graphs
Then the question becomes whether we can simply treat all switches with D i > 1 as the potential targets in G. For small scale graphs, this definition may be workable since there are a few switches in the topology. While for large scale graphs this is not sufficient and can lead to lots of potential targets. Meanwhile, it should be note that, the virtual neighbors of the switch with small d i may also belong to the switch with large d i . For example, in Fig. 3(b) and Fig. 3(c) 
And the expected foreign flow consumption during a single time slot is
according to (3) . To define the potential targets, we use the foreign-local ratio as following,
It reflects the topology feature of S i in graph G. When the foreign-local ratio is bigger than 1, i.e., In contrast, we believe that some of the excluded switches can be added as the potential targets by other definitions with different viewpoints. And as for the numerous switches with d i ≤ (N − 1), the passive detection method [34] can be a more proper way to monitor the table-overflow attack.
B. Traffic Features
Knowing the potential targets, we propose the following traffic features to monitor the attack: growth of foreign flow consumption (GFFC), deviation of flow amount (DFA) and commonness of flow entry (CFE).
1) Growth of Foreign Flow Consumption (GFFC):
Although the attackers can hide themselves by splitting the attack cost, to exhaust the flow table in the target switch S i , the attack payment C F i (t) must be noteworthy. Therefore, GFFC is defined as
During the table-overflow attack, GFFC i (t) increases linearly with the attack rate. A larger GFFC i (t) indicates a burst of foreign flow consumption in S i .
2) Deviation of Flow Amount (DFA):
The burst of foreign flow consumption may also be caused by a sudden increase of normal flows. In order to differentiate the table-overflow attack from the normal flow bust, we propose DFA. The burst normal flows are usually related to special events, such as popular live matches and sudden news. These flows from distributed users rarely share the same middle hop in the network. In contrast, the attack flows have a strong directionality, they are clustered at the d i paths of the target switch. Therefore, DFA is defined as 
3) Commonness of Flow Entry (CFE):
To locate the attackers, we measure the switches presented in the virtual graph using CFE. When S j is the attacker attached switch and S i is the target, the number of common flow entries between R t,L j and R t,F i increases greatly. Therefore, CFE is defined as i . During the table-overflow attack, since the attacker sends lots of flows through its physically connected switch S j , these attack flows can make CFE j (t) increase greatly and become larger comparing with the normal switches.
C. Embedding the Monitoring Mechanism
To make our traffic features practical and meaningful, we propose a monitoring mechanism which can be embedded into the original routing process of SDN. Considering the fact that the control link of SDN is limited and unsuitable for heavy statistics applications [35] , our monitoring mechanism utilizes the existing interactions between the switches and the controller as shown in Fig. 4 .
When SDN-enabled switches finish their registrations, our monitoring mechanism views the established topology in the controller as the graph G = (S, L). Using Algorithm 1, the potential targets in G can be identified. During this step, the controller gets the λ F i , λ G and λ
F,j i
according to the flow arrival rate λ i,j of each path and the network topology. Next, for example S mid is a potential target and an unmatched flow uses S mid as the middle hop in its flow path, after the controller assigns the flow entries to each hop, the monitoring mechanism updates the local flow consumptions of S src and S dst and the foreign flow consumption of S mid . Based on this, our proposed traffic features can be calculated without getting data plane statistics from the SDN-enabled switches. With enough traffic feature samples under normal circumstances and tableoverflow attacks, our monitoring mechanism can recognize such an attack and locate the attacker attached switches.
VI. MITIGATE THE TABLE-OVERFLOW ATTACK
In this section, we propose a mitigation mechanism for the table-overflow attack using the token bucket model. Our mitigation mechanism aims to keep the user's transmission rate while limiting the attacker's transmission rate.
A. Flow Entry Token Bucket
The classic token bucket is a model used to control the packets' average transmission rate and burstiness in computer networks. In that model, the token is added into the bucket at a fixed rate and the bucket has finite capacity. When a packet is transmitted, a token is removed from the bucket. Therefore, the token add rate decides the average transmission rate of packets and the bucket capacity determines the burstiness of the packet transmission.
Given the location of attacker by our monitoring mechanism, we build an FETB (flow entry token bucket) for the attacker attached switch to limit its transmission rate of attack flows. When a flow from the attacker attached switch tries to use the victim switch as the middle hop, a token is removed from the FETB. To control the average transmission rate of the attack flows, the fixed token add rate (denoted by TAR) is defined as
when S i is the victim switch and S j is the attacker attached switch. Meanwhile, we set the bucket capacity (denoted by BC) with the consideration of the current flow table vacancy on the victim switch. It should be noted that, given BC and TAR, the attack time (denoted by T) and the attack rate (denoted by AR) satisfy that Since the attacker always sends non-repeating unmatched packets, the flow entries for the attack flows are removed by the idle timeout. Denoting the idle timeout value as IT, we can calculate the maximum table consumption of the attack (denoted as MTC) by
For different attack rates, we note that the maximum value of MTC is (BC + IT · TAR). Since the current flow table vacancy (denoted by FTV) on the victim switch can be acquired by the controller using the Controller-to-Switches Messages [4] , and the attacker attached switch's proportion is
, to prevent the attacker overloads the victim switch, the maximum value of MTC should satisfy
Therefore, the bucket capacity of the FETB is
B. Embedding the Mitigation Mechanism
To make our work practical, we embed the mitigation mechanism into the original routing process of SDN shown Section III. As the example shown in Fig. 5 , when the monitoring mechanism detects a table-overflow attack against S mid and locates the attacker at S attack , it activates the mitigation mechanism. The mitigation mechanism uses the Controllerto-Switch Messages [4] to make sure the current FTV of S mid . Based on this, the FETB for S attack is established, and its BC and TAR can be calculated according to (15) and (11) .
After this, when a flow from S attack tries to use S mid as the middle hop, S attack sends the routing request to controller. The controller removes a token from the FETB and assigns routing rules to each switch in the flow path. If there are no tokens in the FETB, the flow is cached or discarded at S attack . Since the burstiness in the FETB model is determined by BC, and we have set BC with the consideration of the current flow table vacancy, the transmission rate of attack flows can be limited at S attack . In contrast, the flow from S normal can be transmitted without a token.
However, attackers may repeat their attack flows in time to avoid attack flows being evicted by the idle timeout. In this case, despite limiting the attack rate at S attack , the fixed token add rate may let the attackers occupy the victim switch slowly. Therefore, we use a dynamic token add rate, once the number of flow entries caused by the attacker attached switch exceeds their expected value FTV
. The token add rate is determined by the rate of Flow Removed Message [4] from S i . When a flow from the attacker attached switch is finished at S i , its Flow Removed Message from S i makes a token added into the bucket. In this way, FETB protects the switch against such repeated attack flows.
VII. SIMULATION AND RESULT
In this section, we first present simulations to demonstrate the performance of our monitoring mechanism in WAN, LAN and data center scenarios. Then we present experiments in our testbed to demonstrate the performance of our mitigation mechanism for the table-overflow attack.
A. Monitoring the Table-Overflow Attack 1) Simulation Scenarios and Key Parameters:
In this paper we perform our simulation over three typical types of SDN application scenarios: WAN, LAN and data center. For the WAN scenario, we study the recent simulation instance of software defined WAN [36] and utilize the Barabasi-Albert (BA) model [37] to build the network topologies with the property of scale free. For the LAN scenario, we adopt the real routerlevel dataset from CAIDA [38] . The dataset is computed by the Internet Topology Data Kit (ITDK) under LAN routerlevel topologies. For the data center, we utilize the BCube(n, k) model [39] to build the network topologies, where n means the port number of each switch and k means the recursion times. In the BCube model, both switches and servers are able to forward flows while only servers are the endpoints of paths. Users or attackers are only connected with or reside in servers.
We build different scales of topologies for each type of simulation scenario. For the WAN and LAN scenarios, we build the networks with the switch number N varying from 100 to 1000. For the data center scenario, as the related study [36] recommended, we apply BCube(n, k) model with n varying from 8 to 18 when k is 1 and 2. Since the number of switches in the BCube topology is n k · (k + 1), the switch number N of the data center topology scales from 16 to 972.
In the simulation topologies, as shown in the latter part of this paper, the potential target switch generally holds responsible for hundreds of paths. Considering the traffic characteristics shown in the related studies [5] , [40] that the hot switch can receive thousands of new flows per second, we set the average flow arrival rate of each path as about 10 flows per second. Besides, since different path holds different amount of traffic, we further set the flow arrival rate of each path randomly between 1 to 20 flows per second. 2) Simulation Results: As aforementioned in Algorithm 1, we define the potential targets using the switches' virtual degrees. Fig. 6 shows the virtual degrees of the switches in BA graph and real router-lever graph when their sizes are 500. According to the d i = N − 1 line, there are 12 and 6 potential targets in BA graph and real router-level graph. Since the BA graph is built by adding nodes to a small seed topology, the potential targets of BA graph are mainly distributed in the earlier added nodes. When N varies from 100 to 1000, we get the number of the potential targets shown in Fig. 7 . In general, the number of the potential targets increases with the topology size N.
In contrast, as shown in Fig. 8 , the switches in the BCube graph have the same virtual degree, which is decided by the parameter n and k and satisfies d i = n 2 · n k , the detail explanation can be found in the Appendix. With the increasing of n, the virtual degree of switch increases exponentially and it deviates from the d i = N − 1 line obviously.
From Fig. 8 , we can get some further results. First, due to the dense placement of servers (n (k+1) ) and the sparse placement of switches (n k · (k + 1)), switches in the BCube-based data center face much more forwarding task comparing with the ones in the WAN and LAN scenarios, and they are more likely to be compromised by the table-overflow attack. Second, the heavy forwarding task of switches in BCube(n, k) model (each switch maintains n 2 · n k paths) makes d i > N − 1 a loose definition for potential target. However, since the BCube(n, k) topology is homogeneous (each switch has the same virtual degree), our definition is suitable. Last, the recursive property of BCube makes switches homogeneous in the topology, therefore the number of potential targets in BCube graph increases linearly with the growth of topology size as shown in Fig. 9 .
To evaluate the performance of our monitoring mechanism, we first compare our DFA with the entropy-based traffic feature. It should be noted that, the accuracy of the entropy-based traffic feature depends on the randomness of the flows [18] . However, switches (or servers in the BCube graph) have different numbers of paths which use the target as the middle hop. This affects the randomness of the flows. For a certain potential target, Fig. 10 shows the switch or server numbers of different entropy features. The "positive" switches or servers have fewer paths while the "negative" switches have more paths than the average value. When the attackers send flows through the "positive" devices, the entropy features of the target increase. When the attackers send flows through the "negative" devices, the entropy features of the target decrease. Using the normalized DFA and normalized Src-Ip entropy, Fig. 11 shows the monitoring results when attacker attached switches or servers are "negative" devices. We can see that, both features can differentiate the table-overflow attack, and DFA shows a better sensitivity.
However, when attacker attached switches or servers are "positive" devices, the entropy-based method is not feasible. Fig. 12 shows the monitoring results when attacker attached switches or servers are "positive" devices. We can see that, the Src-Ip entropy value increases and leads to a False Negative (FN) error while DFA feature keeps a well sensitivity to the attack.
Then we compare our GFFC with the average attack rate of attackers in Fig. 13 . As discussed in Section V, the attackers can hide themselves by splitting the attack cost. We can see that, with the growth of attack numbers, it becomes harder to identify an attack according to their request rate. To launch the 500 flows/s table-overflow attack, the average attack cost of the 15 attackers is only less than 35 flows/s, which can be mistaken for normal traffic fluctuations. However, the attack payment CFFC is noteworthy. As shown in Fig. 13 , it grows linearly with the attack rate and is independent with the number of attackers. Fig. 14 . According to the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves and the Confusion Matrixes, we can see that, our method achieves 100% accuracy with a False Positive (FP) rate ranging from 6.3% to 13.7%. During the simulations, as depicted by Fig. 14(b) , Fig. 14(d) and Fig. 14(f) , our method archives an accuracy of 96.4% in the BA graphs, an accuracy of 95.1% in the real router-level graphs and an accuracy of 93.4% in the BCube graphs.
To further locate the attacker attached switches, we calculate CFE when the table-overflow attack is identified. For BA and real topologies, we get the CFE values shown in Fig. 15 . The CFE values of the normal switches range in (0.8, 1.2) while the attack attached switches range in (1.5, 1.9). For the BCube, as shown in Fig. 16 , the CFE values of the normal servers range in (0.7, 1.4) while the attack attached switches range in (1.8, 2.0).
B. Evaluating the Mitigation Mechanism 1) Simulation Settings:
To test the performance of our mitigation mechanism, we program the flow entry token bucket as an application in OpenDaylight controller [41] using REST API. We use OpenvSwitch [33] as the SDN-enabled switch. The controller and each SDN-enabled switch are equipped with an Intel Xeon E5606 CPU working at 2.13GHz and an 8G memory chip. They are operated with Ubuntu Linux 12.04.
We use two laptops to send and accumulate flow entries on the middle hop switch. The attack flows are generated in the form of the ICMP ping flood using Hping [42] . The parameters that we used are listed in Table III. 2) Simulation Results: To avoid the table overflow on the victim switch, we need to control the bucket capacity with the consideration of the current flow table vacancy. According to the experiment settings and the analysis of (15), the calculation result of the maximum BC is 1000. Based on this, the controller can limit the transmission rate of attack flows. For different attack rates, we get the rate limiting results in Fig. 17 . As can be seen, when the bucket has no tokens, the attack flows' transmission rate is limited by the fixed token add rate. The higher the attack rate is, the earlier the limiting action comes. Over a long run, the number of the attack flows is limited to BC + t * TAR.
Since the MTC indicates the maximum allowed table consumption for the attackers, we record the flow table consumptions of the attackers and summarize them in Fig. 18 . We can see that, with the rate limiting and the calculated bucket capacity, the maximum flow table consumption of the attackers is limited to MTC. Over a long run, the flow table consumption of the attackers is IT * TAR.
However, attackers may repeat their attack flows in time to avoid attack flows being evicted by the idle timeout. To simulate the effect of repeated attack flows, we force the controller to assign static flow entries for the non-repeat attack flows. The static flow entries have infinite idle timeout value, and they will not be removed until we delete them manually. In this case, the performance of FETB is shown in Fig. 19 . We use the dynamic token add rate, once the number of flow entries caused by attack flows exceeds 2,000.
Comparing with the recent QoS-aware mitigation strategy [32] , which redirects attack flows to the idle peer switch, our mitigation mechanism limits the attack rate at the attacker attached switches. Using the proper bucket capacity and token add rate, FETB avoids the table overflow on the victim switch.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we examined the table-overflow attack in SDN with practical considerations and concluded that existing solutions were unable to protect the system under such an attack. To address this issue, we first proposed a monitoring mechanism to detect the table-overflow attack during the original routing process of SDN. Three traffic features were designed to differentiate the attack and locate the attackers. We then proposed a mitigation mechanism to reduce the transmission rate of attack flows on the attacker attached switch. We designed a flow entry token bucket model to avoid the table overflow on the victim switch. Extensive simulations were conducted to evaluate and show the effectiveness of our solution against the table-overflow attack.
APPENDIX
The BCube(n, k) model creates iterative graphs, the smallest iteration unit is BCube 0 and the largest iteration unit is BCube k−1 . For example, Fig. 20(a) shows the topology of BCube (4, 1) . In fact, in such an iterative graph, the switches in different levels are homogenous and can be exchanged. When we exchange the level 0 switches with the level 1 switches in Fig. 20(a) , we get Fig. 20(b) . The iterative feature of BCube(n, k) model makes the switches have the same d i .
Since the switches have the same d i , we only need to find one switch's d i . The simplest way is to choose a switch in 
